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Abstract— Electric transmission and distribution systems are 
subject not only to natural occurring outages but also to 
intentional attacks. These lasts performed by malicious agents 
that aim at maximizing the load shedding of the system. 
Intentional attacks are counteracted by the reaction of the system 
operator which deploys strategies to minimize the damage caused 
by such attacks. This paper presents a bilevel modeling approach 
for enhancing resilience of power systems with high participation 
of distributed generation (DG). The model describes the 
interaction of a disruptive agent that aims at maximizing damage 
to a power system and the system operator that resorts to 
different strategies to minimize system damage. The proposed 
mixed integer nonlinear programming model is solved with a 
hybrid genetic algorithm. Results are presented on a benchmark 
power system showing the optimal responses of the system 
operator for a set of deliberate attacks. It was observed that the 
higher the participation of DG the lower the impact of the attacks 
was. The presence of DG also influenced the optimal strategies of 
the attacker which in some cases deviated from optimal attack 
plans to suboptimal solutions. This allows concluding that the 
presence of DG benefits the power system in terms of less 
expected load shedding under intentional attacks.       
 
Index Terms— Bilevel programming, distributed generation, 
interdiction problem, power systems, resilience.  
 
 Resumen— Los sistemas de transmisión y distribución están 
sujetos no solo a fallas naturales sino también a fallas causadas 
por ataques intencionales. Estos últimos llevados a cabo por 
agentes maliciosos que tienen como objetivo maximizar el 
deslastre de carga del sistema. Los ataques intencionales son 
contrarrestados por la reacción del operador del sistema que 
lleva a cabo estrategias para minimizar el daño causado por los 
ataques. Este artículo presenta un modelo de programación 
binivel para mejorar la resiliencia de los sistemas de potencia con 
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alta participación de generación distribuida (GD). El modelo 
describe la interacción de un agente disruptivo que pretende 
maximizar el daño al sistema de potencia y el operador de red 
que recurre a diferentes estrategias para minimizar el daño. El 
modelo propuesto es no lineal entero mixto y se soluciona 
mediante un algoritmo genético híbrido.  Se pudo observar que a 
mayor participación de la GD el impacto de los ataques era 
menor. La presencia de GD también tuvo influencia en las 
estrategias del atacante, el cual, en algunos casos, se desviaba de 
los ataques óptimos a soluciones sub-óptimas. Lo anterior 
permite concluir que la presencia de GD beneficia al sistema de 
potencia en términos de menor deslastre de carga esperado ante 
ataques intencionales.       
 
Palabras claves—Programación binivel, generación distribuida, 
problema de interdicción, sistemas de potencia, resiliencia. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ODERN societies are highly dependent on the reliable 
operation of critical infrastructure. Electric transmission 
and distribution systems are examples of structures that need 
to be protected from both natural occurring phenomena and 
malicious attacks [1]. Due to their meshed topology, power 
outages due to failures of the transmission system are not as 
often as those in distribution systems; nevertheless, 
transmission failures affect a greater number of customers 
with higher costs involved [2]. The classical approach to 
power system vulnerability assessment consists on verifying 
that the system is able to operate within specified limits after 
the failure of one or two elements. This is the so called N-1 or 
N-2 security criterion. Although this approach provides a 
useful insight regarding the vulnerability of a network, it does 
not consider the fact that power lines are susceptible to 
deliberate attacks.  
 The first approach to model deliberate attacks in power 
systems considering deliberate attacks within a two-agent 
model was proposed in [3]. In this case, two agents are 
considered: an attacker and a defender. The former is a 
malicious agent that aims at maximizing damage to the power 
system by destroying lines; while the latter is the system 
operator that must redispatch the available generation to 
minimize load shedding. This interaction is modeled in a 
bilevel programming framework. The attacker or disruptive 
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agent is positioned in the upper-level optimization problem, 
while the system operator is positioned in the lower-level 
optimization problem. This scheme also corresponds to an 
action-reaction or leader-follower game.  
Since the seminal work reported in [3], several studies have 
been performed to approach the bilevel attacker-defender 
problem (also known in the specialized literature as the 
interdiction problem or terrorist threat problem). In [4] the 
authors proposed a generalization of the interdiction problem 
that allows  defining differentiated objective functions for the 
attacker and defender which was not possible within the min-
max model proposed in [3]. In this case, the disruptive agent 
aims at minimizing the number of power system components 
that must be rendered out of service so that the load shedding 
is equal to or greater than a specified value. Such goal is 
contrasted with the assumption that the system operator would 
deploy strategies to alleviate the impact of the attack. In [5] 
the attacker-defender problem is solved thorough a 
generalization of the Benders decomposition method. The 
model is devised to identify the set of power system circuits 
that would maximize economic losses to customers if such 
elements are destroyed. In [6], transmission line switching is 
introduced as a binary variable in the optimization problem 
solved by the system operator to account for another strategy 
to mitigate the impact of deliberate attacks. In [7] the authors 
introduce cascading outages in the interdiction problem to 
consider short-term and medium-term impacts on the system. 
The attacker-defender model has also been introduced 
within the expansion planning problem as presented in  [8] 
and [9]. In both papers, the bilevel programming framework is 
expanded into a tri-level optimization model which considers 
the agent in charge of the system expansion planning as the 
one that must find the right set of reinforcements to minimize 
the damage caused by a disruptive agent, which in turn must 
anticipate the reaction of the system operator. A similar 
modeling applied to distribution networks is also presented in 
[10]. Recent studies have also combined cyber and physical 
attacks within a similar attacker-defender structure are 
reported in [11] and [12].  
The attacker-defender bilevel programming model that 
describes the interaction of a malicious agent and the system 
operator is a challenging nonconvex discrete optimization 
problem [13]. A way to tackle this problem is turning the 
original bilevel formulation into an equivalent single-level 
problem. This can be performed by substituting the lower-
level optimization problem by its KKT (Karush Kuhn Tucker) 
optimality conditions. Also, an equivalent alternative is the 
use of duality properties as presented in [4]. In both cases, 
linearization strategies must be performed to turn the original 
nonlinear bilevel formulation into a single-level linear 
equivalent. Nevertheless, this strategy is not applicable when 
the lower-level optimization problem is nonlinear (for 
example with an AC representation of the network), that is 
because the KKT conditions are in this case necessary but not 
sufficient to guarantee optimality. Therefore, when modeling 
the network with an AC approach the best way to deal with 
the attacker-defender problem is by means of metaheuristic 
techniques. Nevertheless, few studies have been conducted in 
this regard [14], [15].    
An attacker-defender model is proposed in this paper to 
examine the effect of distributed generation (DG) in the 
resilience of power systems subjected to intentional attacks. 
The proposed model considers the interaction of two agents 
with conflicting interests. On the one hand, a disruptive agent, 
with limited destructive resources, aims at executing an attack 
plan that would maximize the damage of the system. On the 
other hand, the system operator aims at protecting the system 
by redispatching available generation resources. The model 
includes de effect of DG that can be used as back up 
generation to mitigate the impact of malicious attacks, and 
therefore reduce load shedding. For the sake of simplicity only 
dispatchable DG technologies are considered in the model. 
Given the fact that bilevel programming problems are 
nonlinear and nonconvex and that the network is represented 
by its AC model, a hybrid genetic algorithm (HGA) was 
implemented for the solution of the model. A number of tests 
were carried out on the IEEE 24 bus reliability test system and 
a comparison with other models reported in the specialized 
literature is provided. It was found that the participation of DG 
reduces the effect of disruptive attacks resulting in higher 
benefits for customers and the system operator. The model 
also provides a list of critical transmission assets that can be 
used by the system planer to consider reinforcements in 
strategic elements improving the resilience of the power 
system.   
The rest of the document is organized as follows: the 
mathematical formulation of the problem is presented in 
Section II, Section III describes the methodology implemented 
to solve the proposed model, Section IV describes the tests 
and results; and finally, Section V presents the main 
conclusions of the research.     
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION 
Fig. 1 depicts the scheme of the attacker-defender problem. 
Note that for every action of the upper-level agent there is a 
reaction of the lower-level agent; from the standpoint of game 
theory, the attacker-defender problem corresponds to a leader-
follower game.  
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Minimize: Impact of the Attack










Fig. 1. Bilevel attacker-defender problem. 
 
A. Upper-level Optimization Problem 
The purpose of the disruptive agent is to maximize the total 
load shedding as indicated in (1).  In this case, the lower index 
n indicates the number of the bus; while the upper index d, 
refers to the demand. This is subject to the limits of 
destructive resources as given by (2). In this case, 𝐼𝑉 stands 
for Interdiction Vector, which is a binary array that indicates 
the states of every transmission asset.  Fig. 2 illustrates an 
example of an interdiction vector in a power system. Note that 
lines identified as L1, L5, L10 and L12 are under attack and 
represented by entries equal to zero in the corresponding 
positions of the IV. The expression given by (3) indicates the 
nature of the interdiction vector entries while (4) represents 
the reaction of the system operator. 
 
    𝑀𝑎𝑥








∑ (1 − 𝐼𝑉𝑙) = 𝑀;     
𝑙  ∈ 𝐿
  ∀𝑙 ∈  𝐿 (2) 
 










𝑑: Active load shedding at bus n  
𝐼𝑉: Interdiction vector  
𝐼𝑉𝑙 : L
th entry of the interdiction vector 
N: Set of buses  
L: Set of lines  
𝑀: Limit of destructive resources  
 
 
Fig. 2. Example of an interdiction vector (IV): entries in 0 indicate that the 
corresponding element is under attack.  
 
B. Lower-Level Optimization Problem  
This problem corresponds to the reaction of the system 
operator. The details of this problem are presented below.  
  
1) Lower-Level Objective Function 
In this case, the objective function given by (5) is exactly 
the opposite of the disruptive agent, which relates to the 
minimization of the total load shedding.   
 
 
𝑀𝑖𝑛  ∑ ∆𝑃𝑛
𝑑
𝑛 ∈ 𝑁
;                ∀𝑛 ∈  𝑁 (5) 
 
2) Power Balance Equations  
Net power injections of active and reactive power must be 
zero as indicated by (7) and (8). In this case, 𝑃𝑛
𝐺  and 𝑃𝑛
𝐷𝐺  
indicate the active power generation provided by centralized 
and DG, respectively.  𝑃𝑛 and 𝑃𝑛
𝑑 represent the active power 
injection and demand at bus n, respectively. Note that the 











𝑑 − 𝑄𝑛 = 0;    ∀𝑛 ∈  𝑁 (7) 
 
3) Limits on Active and Reactive Power Generation 
Constraints given by (8) and (9) indicate limits on active 
power provided by centralized and DG, respectively. 
Equations given by (10) and (11) account for reactive power 
limits of centralized and DG, respectively. In this case 
upper scripts min and max indicate the type of limit; finally, 
J indicates the set of centralized generator while K stands 

















𝐺𝐷_𝑚𝑎𝑥;        ∀𝑘 ∈  𝐾 (11) 
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4) Voltage Limits  
The AC representation of the network considers limits on 
magnitude and voltage angles as indicated in (12) and (13), 
respectively. In this case, 𝜃𝑛 and 𝑉𝑛 and indicate the angle 
and magnitude of the voltage at bus n, respectively.   
 
𝑉𝑛
𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 𝑉𝑛 ≤ 𝑉𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥;            ∀𝑛 ∈  𝑁    (12) 
 𝜃𝑛
𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 𝜃𝑛 ≤ 𝜃𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ;           ∀𝑛 ∈  𝑁 (13) 
 
5) Power Flow Limits 
Power flow limits must be enforced in normal operation 
and under any attack. The expressions given by (14) and 
(15) indicate the active and reactive power flow in each 
line. Note that the power flow expressions are multiplied by 
the corresponding entry of the interdiction vector. If a given 
position of the interdiction vector is zero (indicating that the 
element is under attack) the corresponding power flows 
must be zero. In this case 𝑔𝑚𝑛 and 𝑏𝑚𝑛 are the conductance 
and susceptance of line 𝑙𝑚𝑛, respectively. Equations (16) 




= (𝐼𝑉𝑙) ∗ [𝑉𝑛
2𝑔𝑚𝑛 − 𝑉𝑛𝑉𝑚𝑔𝑚𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝜃𝑚𝑛)
− 𝑉𝑛𝑉𝑚𝑏𝑚𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑛(𝜃𝑚𝑛)];  ∀𝑙 




= 𝐼𝑉𝑙) ∗ [−𝑉𝑛
2𝑏𝑚𝑛 + 𝑉𝑛𝑉𝑚𝑏𝑚𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝜃𝑚𝑛)
− 𝑉𝑛𝑉𝑚𝑔𝑚𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑛(𝜃𝑚𝑛)];      ∀𝑙 












;       ∀𝑙 ∈  𝐿 (17) 
 
6) Load Shedding Limits 
Constraints (18) and (19) indicate that load shedding 
corresponding to active and reactive power, denoted as ∆𝑃𝑛
𝑑 
and ∆𝑄𝑛
𝑑 must be lower or equal than the total active and 
reactive demand of each bus denoted as 𝑃𝑛






𝑑;                ∀𝑛 ∈  𝑁    (18) 
0 ≤ ∆𝑄𝑛
𝑑 ≤ 𝑄𝑛
𝑑;                ∀𝑛 ∈  𝑁 (19) 
III. METHODOLOGY  
The model given by equations (1)-(19) is nonlinear and 
nonconvex; therefore, a metaheuristic was developed to find 
high quality solutions of such model. This is a common 
practice to tackle bilevel programming problems, especially 
when the lower-level optimization problem is nonlinear  [15]. 
In this case, HGA as depicted in Fig. 3 was implemented.  
 














Fig. 3. Flowchart of the proposed HGA. 
 
A. Problem Codification  
Codification of the HGA is depicted in Fig.2. An alternative 
representation of the IV is illustrated in Fig.4. The entries of 
IV correspond to the number of the element under attack. The 
main advantage of the integer codification over the binary one 
is that the former avoids unfeasible solutions when performing 
the crossover stage.   
 
 
Fig. 4. Codification of the attacker-defender problem: a) binary and b) integer.  
 
B. Initial Population  
The initial population is a set of interdiction vectors that are 
randomly generated bearing in mind the limits on destructive 
resources of the attacker (M). In this case, it is considered that 
every line has the same attacking cost (equal to one) so that M 
indicates the number of lines to be attacked.  
C. Objective Function Evaluation  
Once an initial population is generated, the objective 
function is evaluated. This stage is the fitness function 
evaluation indicated in Fig. 3. The fitness function evaluation 
is performed by running an optimal power flow (OPF) for 
every IV considering the new states of the lines. The  OPFs 
are computed using Matpower [16]. Fictitious generators are 
used to account for load shedding, to guarantee the feasibility 
of the OPF. Every IV of the initial population is evaluated and 
their corresponding load shedding (objective function) is 
stored. 
D. Selection by Tournament 
A two-round tournament is performed over the initial 
formulation for the selection stage. In this case, two subsets 
with k randomly selected elements are built; then, the best 
elements (interdiction vectors with the highest load shedding) 
of each subset are chosen as the parents.  An illustration of the 
selection stage is depicted in Fig. 5.  






Fig. 5. Illustration of selection by tournament.  
E. Crossover  
Once the two parents are selected in the previous stage, the 
crossover is executed. A single point crossover is done for 
binary representations of the IV, while a crossover by 
alternating positions is performed for integer representations 
of IVs as indicated in Fig. 6. Once the crossover is performed 
the objective function of both offspring is evaluated.  
 
 
Fig. 6. Crossover by alternating positions.  
 
F. Local Search and New Generation  
The best solution is selected out of the two offspring 
generated in the crossover stage. Over this IV a local search is 
carried out to identify neighboring solutions with better 
objective function. The local search is performed by changing 
the states of the entries of the IV and, after verifying 
feasibility, computing the new objective function. If a new and 
better solution is found, this one is introduced in the new 
generation only if it is better and different than any of the 
solutions of the current population. The process continues 
until a given number of generations are evaluated.  
IV. TESTS AND RESULTS 
To test the effectiveness of the described model and 
solution approach, a number of tests were carried out using the 
IEEE 24 bus reliability test system, which is composed of 38 
branches, 11 generators, 17 loads and 24 buses. The interested 
reader can consult the data of this system in [17].  The tests 
were carried out for a day of winter season at 6:00 pm, 
considering a demand of 2850MW. For comparative purposes 
initial tests were performed without the effect of DG. The 
HGA was set with 50 initial solutions and 100 generators, and 
k=5 for tournament selection.  
 
A. Results without DG  
The best solutions found for diverse values of M are 
presented in Table I. A comparison is presented with previous 
works reported in the specialized literature. In this case, LS 
stands for load shedding. The results obtained with the 
proposed methodology (without DG) are in some cases better 
than those found in  [13] and [18]. This is because a nonlinear 
model of the network has been taken into account. 
Furthermore, for M=4 a different solution from the one 
reported in [13] was found. These solutions are indicated in 
Fig. 7. The square represents the solution reported in [13] 
while the circle corresponds to the solution found in [18] and 



















Fig. 6. Different solutions found for M =4 (without DG).  
 
TABLE I 
PRELIMINARY TESTS AND COMPARISON OF RESULTS (WITHOUT DG)  










2 11-14, 14-16 194 194 194 
3 16-19, 20-23, 20-23 309 - 309 
4 3-24, 12-23,13-23, 14-16 442 516 526 
5 
11-13, 12-13, 12-23, 14-
16, 15-24 
842 - 842 
 
B. Results with DG: Case 1  
There are different generation technologies that can be used 
as DG. Some of these are based on intermittent resources such 
as wind and photovoltaic generation. Due to their nature, when 
an outage takes place it is not guaranteed that such DG units 
would be available for back-up generation. Therefore, for the 
sake of simplicity, only dispatchable DG units are considered 
in the model.  Initially, a small participation (from 5 to 10%) 
of DG was considered uniformly for all load buses. In this 
case, the destroyed lines reported in Table I remained the 
same; however, the load shedding was reduced in the same 
rate as the participation of DG (see Table II). These results 
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make sense since part of the expected load shedding is 
supplied by the DG units. Nevertheless, results are different 
when the participation of DG is strategically located in load 
buses. This is explained in the next subsection.  
 
TABLE II 
PRELIMINARY TESTS AND COMPARISON OF RESULTS (WITHOUT DG)  










2 11-14, 14-16 194 184.3 174.6 




526 499.7 473 
5 
11-13, 12-13, 12-23, 
14-16, 15-24 
842 799.9 757 
 
C. Results with DG: Case 2  
Table III shows three different attack plans for M=2 
considering different participation of DG. The first attack plan 
is the one already reported in Table I in which no DG is 
considered. In this case, lines 11-14 and 14-16 are attacked 
leaving bus 14 isolated from the system. Although there is a 
generator in bus 14 this one is used as a synchronous capacitor 
and does not provide active power. Nevertheless, if DG is 
located in this bus to cover up to 30% of the local demand, 
then the strategy of the attacker changes and a new attack plan 
is found. The new optimal solution for the attacker consists on 
isolating bus 6 by destroying lines 6-10 and 6-2 resulting in a 
load shedding of 136MW; again, if part of this demand (at 
least 45%) along with the one already considered in bus 14, 
the attacker must find another strategy to cause damage. In 
this case, the new strategy consists on attacking lines 4-9 and 
4-2 which results in a much less load shedding of 74MW.  The 
attack plans presented in Table III are illustrated in Fig. 6. 
Black circles and squares represent attack plans 1 and 2, while 




DIFFERENT ATTACK PLANS FOR M=2 (WITH DG) 
Attack 
plan 




(% of local load)  
1 11-14, 14-16 194 0 
2 6-10, 6-2 136 Bus 14 (30%) 
3 4-9, 4-2 74 
Bus 14 (30%) and 


















Fig. 6. Different solutions found for M =2 (with DG).  
 
 There are also alternative solutions with M=3 when 
considering DG located in strategic load buses. The default 
attack plan for M=3 (without DG) consists on destroying lines 
16-19, 20-23, 20-23, isolating load buses 19 and 20 (see Fig. 


















Fig. 7. Attack plan for M =3 (without DG).  
 
The strategic location of DG at buses 19 and 20 leads to a 
reduction of the expected load shedding. If approximately 
37.2% of this demand is locally supplied, then the initial 
attack plan would change and the new strategy would be to 
attack lines 16-14 and 14-11 plus any other line (multiple 
solutions are found with the same load shedding), which 
results in 194MW of load shedding.  
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For M=4 and M=5 the strategies of the disruptive agent 
found by the HGA do not change with the presence of DG 
(only the amount of load shedding). With this amount of 
resources, the strategy of the disruptive agent is not performed 
locally, but instead the attack is systemic, in the sense that it 
aims at detaching the upper and lower portions of the system, 
this is because most generation resources are located in the 
upper section of the system. DG in this case might mitigate the 
consequences of the attack by reducing the effective load 
shedding; however, it won’t persuade the attacker to look for a 


















Fig. 8. Attack plan for M =5 (with and without DG).  
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper presented an attacker-defender model that 
considers the interaction of a malicious agent and the system 
operator. The two-agent interaction is conceived as a bilevel 
programming problem, which is then solved using a hybrid 
genetic algorithm that considers local search instead of 
mutation. The novelty of the proposed approach lies on 
considering the effect of dispatchable DG. Several tests 
performed on an IEEE benchmark system showed the 
applicability and effectiveness of the presented model and 
solution approach. Results show that DG does not have a 
significant impact on the strategies of the disruptive agent 
when this one is scattered in the system with a small 
percentage. Nevertheless, DG allocated in strategic load buses 
proved to be effective in both reducing load shedding and 
moving the strategies of the disruptive agent toward sub-
optimal solutions.  
The information provided by the proposed algorithm can be 
used by the system operator and system planer to device 
strategies in order to reduce the vulnerability of the power 
system and improve its relicense, minimizing the load 
shedding resulting from malicious attacks. These strategies 
might include the location of DG in strategic load buses as 
illustrated in the paper, stricter surveillance of specific 
transmission assets or their reinforcement.     
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